Russia-Ukraine Invasion
Out of context: Reply #770
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- monNom0
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Co…
For those that like to understand the 'why' of all this, I came across this article about 'Counterinsurgency' last night and it seems to fit quite well with what's going on in Ukraine right now. It gives a deeper understanding of the strategies and tactics that might be at play on both sides.
Key points: Russia has describe this conflict in terms that suggest it views it as a counter-insurgency ('Special Operation' rather than war, 'ridding Ukraine of Nazis', removing an illegitimate gov't and supporting new elections). Counter-insurgency is about winning hearts and minds. To gain the support of the population rather than control territory. Getting the large portion of the population that is neutral in the conflict to either be supportive or at least not resistive to your authority. This can be done with positive or negative reinforcement. IE: food and medical aid, smiles from the soldiers and Hershey's bars for the kids, or disappearances, starvation, and bombing the shit out of towns until they have no will left to fight.
Here is the classic Russian Counter Insurgency strategy as described in the article:
"...throughout the history of Czarist Russian, the Russians fought many counterinsurgencies as new Caucasian and Central Asian territory were occupied.[89] It was in these conflicts that the Russians developed the following counterinsurgency tactics:[89]- Deploy a significant number of troops
- Isolate the area from outside assistance
- Establish tight control of major cities and towns
- Build lines of forts to restrict insurgent movement
- Destroy the springs of resistance through destruction of settlements, livestock, crops etc.These tactics, generally speaking, were carried over into Soviet use following the 1917 revolution for the most part, save for the integration of political-military command.[90] This tactical blue print saw use following the First and Second World Wars in Dagestan, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, Lithuania and Ukraine.[89] This doctrine was ultimately shown to be inadequate in The Soviet War in Afghanistan, mostly due to insufficient troop commitment, and in the Wars in Chechnya.[89]"
It's worth reading the whole thing. But especially the section on Theorists (and of those, particularly David Galula and Lorenzo Zambernardi) which gives a deeper understanding of the goals and trade-offs of counter-insurgency approaches.