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Head, Warden v. Carr and Carr v. Head, Warden, Nos. S00A1798 and S00X1800. Appeal from Butts County Habeas Court (originally Fulton County), and Monroe County Superior Court.
No. S00A1798
The issues in this appeal are: Whether the trial court’s finding of ineffective assistance of counsel was based upon a non-deferential hindsight analysis of the attorney’s performance; whether the habeas court erroneously ruled that trial counsel was deficient in not enforcing a “deal” and in allowing petitioner to give a statement to the district attorney and testify at the co- defendant’s trial; whether the habeas court erred by failing to make a deficiency or prejudice analysis in finding that trial counsel was not effective during voir dire; and whether trial counsel’s representation of Carr was deficient causing prejudice to Carr.Evidence presented at trial showed that Timothy Don Carr and his girlfriend, Melissa Burgeson, were at a party with Keith Patrick Young, the 17-year-old victim. Carr and Burgeson discussed robbing the victim at the party. Later, Burgeson talked the victim into letting her drive his car with Carr, the victim, and two juveniles as passengers. Burgeson stopped on a dirt road and at her urging Carr stabbed the victim with a knife and beat him with a baseball bat. After the murder, Carr and Burgeson fled to Tennessee in the car and were arrested after a high speed chase. They were placed in the back of a patrol car where a hidden tape recorder recorded their incriminating statements. Carr was convicted of malice murder and auto theft, and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences in 1997. Carr filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 1998. The habeas court found that trial counsel had been ineffective and vacated Carr’s death sentence. The Warden brings this appeal.
The Warden points out that the court in Strickland warned against the danger of a hindsight-based, post-trial inquiry into trial counsel’s performance. The Warden argues that post-conviction review of trial counsel’s conduct is supposed to be highly deferential to the trial court’s finding. Carr maintains that the habeas court granted relief to Carr because the trial counsel committed a series of unreasonable errors which made the sentencing decision unreliable. Carr claims that trial counsel inadequately investigated and prepared Carr’s case. He asserts that trial counsel recklessly put the case at a disadvantage by advising Carr to give the State a confession without adequately advising him of the consequences.
The Warden asserts that the habeas court’s findings were erroneous regarding an alleged “deal” made by trial counsel with the district attorney before trial. Further, the Warden argues that trial counsel’s decision to allow Carr to sign a waiver, give a statement, and then testify at his co- defendant’s trial was part of a reasonable trial strategy. Carr claims that his trial counsel and the district attorney believed that an agreement had been reached as to a life sentence.
Cross-Appeal No. S00X1800.
The issues in this cross-appeal are: Whether the habeas court erred in failing to find that the prosecutor committed acts of misconduct which denied Carr a fair trial; whether the habeas court erred by denying some of Carr’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; whether the habeas court erred in failing to find that Carr’s 1986 simple battery adjudication was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights; whether the habeas court erred by finding that the trial court’s errors were either barred or procedurally defaulted on habeas corpus.Carr claims that the prosecutor improperly suppressed favorable evidence, knowingly presented false or perjured testimony, and engaged in improper argument. He argues that the evidence shows that deals were struck with the two key juvenile witnesses which were not disclosed to Carr. The Warden contends that the habeas court properly found that there were no deals in exchange for the juveniles’ testimony.
Carr asserts that the habeas court improperly denied a number of other reasons why trial counsel was ineffective in both the guilt-innocence and penalty phases of trial. The Warden counters that there was no deal and Carr was not prejudiced in the guilt-innocence phase because he believed that he had to testify since he had given the DA a statement before trial.
Carr’s1986 adjudication for simple battery was used by the State as non-statutory aggravating evidence. Carr claims that this adjudication resulted from an invalid guilty plea and he is actually innocent. The Warden claims that Carr’s juvenile adjudication for simple battery was properly introduced as non-statutory aggravating evidence, and Carr’s plea to the 1986 offense was knowing and voluntary.